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Psychological Culture: Ambivalence and Resistance to Social Change 
Alexander Etkind 
 
"National character," "modal personality," "collective unconscious," "ethnic 
mentality," "cultural identity" -- these and similar notions are designed to 
capture psychological traits that distinguish one social group from 
another. Attempts to isolate such hypothetical qualities are not different in 
principle from efforts to describe religious, legal, or other social patterns 
found among people who have lived together for a length of time, except 
that psychological constructs tend to focus on subjective characteristics 
and are somewhat harder to identify. [1] For the first time, the link 
between culture and psychology came under close scrutiny in the nineteen 
century. German linguists Steinthal and Lazarus and psychologist Wilhelm 
Wundt made an elaborate case for "Folkpsychology" -- a discipline that 
examined the interfaces between folklore, language, social institutions, 
and psychological traits. In this century, around the time of World War II, 
much attention was given to the so-called "modal personality" and 
"national character" that purported to describe the ways in which other 
people, often belonging to enemy nations, raised their children and 
behaved in their daily life. Margaret Mead, Clyde Kluckhohn, Geoffrey 
Gorer, Henry Dick, along with other social scientists, developed a concept 
of the Russian national character which sought to explain the 
contradictions in the overt behavior of America's arch-enemy in 
psychological terms. [2] In the last few decades, scholars began to pay 
closer attention to the role that culture and psychology plays in nation-
building. As economic differences between nations level off, less tangible 
cultural characteristics -- emotional, cognitive, aesthetic, axiological -- 
have come to the fore as key factors determining national peculiarities. E. 
Gellner put it most provocatively when he said that cultures produced 
nations, not the other way around. [3] 
As is the case with any other field dealing with human behavior, cultural 
psychology has its share of methodological and ideological difficulties. For 
one thing, scholars working in this area tend to gloss over considerable 
psychological variations within human groups. This is the source of many 
questionable generalizations about ethnic psychology, national character, 
etc. Complicating the situation, also, are differences in the ways 
individuals perceive themselves and the manner they appear to outside 
observers. [4] The latter tend to comprehend other people's actions in 
terms of their motifs and rigid personality traits, while insiders attribute 
their own actions to external circumstances beyond their control. Few 
insiders agree with the judgments nonmembers pass on the local mores. 
What appears to be odd and problematic for those looking from without, 
seems self-evident and natural for group members. When things go awry, 
insiders are likely to excuse themselves and blame conspiracy, foreign 
interference, or bad luck for their problems. By contrast, an outside 
observer is apt to spot bad habits, ingrained inaptitude, or some other 
questionable personality traits behind the problems at hand and assign 
much responsibility for these problems to group members themselves. 
Take, for instance, the Marquis de Custine, a French writer who visited 
Russia in 1839, returned from his trip disgusted with what he had seen. 
He did not care for Russian customs, but was convinced that the Russians 
were to be blamed for their own misfortunes. His conclusion was a 
classical case of blaming the victim: "The oppressed have always merited 
their sufferings." [5] 
This propensity to impugn other people's motifs and exonerate one's own 
conduct is the source of many ethnic and racial biases in cross-cultural 
perception. Cultural psychology could be employed for pernicious political 
purposes. Thus, the Nazis expressed great interest in Carl Jung's theories 
about the race spirit and collective unconsciousness. While this fact does 
not necessarily disqualify Jung's theories, it calls for caution: cultural 
psychology can be used to fan ethnic hatred. [6] 
To counter Jung's national-psychology, Freud and his followers developed 
a sort of biological internationalism that ruled out any cultural specificity 
of mental processes. A. Adler and W. Reich took a keen interest in Marxist 
theory and even tried to help the Soviet government employ psychology 
in the cause of socialism. Denying any cultural specificity to psychological 
phenomena can present its own problems. This century knows several 
utopian projects designed to unify all mankind on the basis of common 
political (Marxist), mystical (Free Masonery), religious (the Reverend Moon 
unification movement), linguistic (Esperanto), and other supposedly 
universal qualities inherent in human nature and waiting to be summoned 
by skillful manipulation. The manner in which such projects have been 
implemented sometimes match the ruthlessness of the politics of racial 
and ethnic exclusion. German Nazis and Russian communists might have 
entertained opposite views on human nature but relied on the same mass-
scale violence to implement their political schemes. Which brings us to the 
central theme of this essay. 
There is a difference between "psychology" as an academic discipline and 
"psychology" as a shorthand for personality traits common in a given 
population. This difference is not especially pertinent when it comes to 
traditional, preindustrial societies, which did not evolve their own 
psychological science. But in modern societies that have established 
psychology as an academic discipline with a strong applied dimension, we 
have to deal with a peculiar situation where "scientific knowledge" about 
the individual and group psyche is fed back to group members and to 
some extent informs their self-perception, if not actual behavior. The case 
in point is academic psychology in the Soviet Union that, from the start, 
was entrusted with the political task of building the "New Soviet Man" -- a 
model personality suitable for a future socialist society. We can speak in 
this connection about "psychological culture" by which we shall 
understand a set of theories and practices that describe, prescribe and 
facilitate the formation of certain cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
traits in a given population. Psychological culture is not identical with the 
way concrete individuals feel, think, and act, but it offers them ready-
made models for self-understanding and thus enters their psychological 
make-up. We should bear in mind, also, that the term "psychology" did 
not carry the same meaning in the Soviet context as it did in the West. 
There was no sharp line separating psychology from other so-called "social 
sciences." All these disciplines functioned as branches of "ideology" -- an 
overarching field which encompassed political theory, moral philosophy, 
historical science, applied psychology, and other subservient domains of 
knowledge reenforced by the government propaganda machinery and 
penal institutions. To understand Soviet psychological culture, therefore, 
we need to take a broader look at the political context within which it 
came into existence and was made to serve the system. 
In this chapter, I will examine systematic efforts on the part of Soviet 
authorities to formulate, shape, and enforce a certain personality type in 
the Soviet population. I begin with a brief overview of stereotypes about 
the Russian psyche as it appeared to foreign observers, and survey the 
precursors of Soviet psychology in prerevolutionary Russia . Then, I shall 
turn to the Soviet era and the competing political-psychological projects 
for raising a New Soviet Man. Next, I shall analyze the model Soviet 
personality envisioned by Stalin and the evolution of this model in post-
Stalinist Russia. And finally, I shall discuss the consequences that the 
decades of building the New Socialist Man have had on the current efforts 
to form a democratic society in Russia. 
Russian Psyche from the Outsider's and Insider's Point of View 
Popular stereotypes differ from scientific concepts in at least one 
important respect: they are not meant to predict actual conduct and test a 
theory. Their main function is to reduce complexity to a neat scheme, to 
make understandable odd behavior, and quite often, to disparage 
outsiders for their alien ways. Stereotypes are influenced by political 
attitudes, artistic accounts, exemplary personalities, as well by the past 
and present relationships between the groups to which both an observer 
and an observed belong. Notoriously unreliable as guides to understanding 
other cultures, stereotypes tell us something important about both the 
culture observed and observer's own culture. 
For centuries, Russian culture has fascinated people in the West, who 
alternatively expressed their admiration and disgust for its inimitable 
ways. [7] In modern times, this interest would occasionally take curiously 
sexual overtones. Diderot and Voltaire looked up to the Empress Katherine 
the Great to realize the Enlightenment ideals. Marx held a life-long 
contempt for Russia and its rulers, but shortly before his death, he was so 
impressed with the inroads that socialist ideas made in this country that 
he set himself the task of learning the Russian language. Nietzsche was in 
love with a Russian lady, Lou Andreas-Salome, asked her to marry him, 
and, distressed by her refusal, commenced his magnum opus "Thus Spoke 
Zaratustra." Carl Jung fell in love with Sabina Spielrein, another Russian 
woman, who had a great impact on his personal and professional career. 
Stereotypes about the Russian psyche popular in the West ascribe to 
Russians a bewildering mix of qualities, such as laziness and hard work, 
dependency and disobedience, moodiness and exaltation, mysticism and 
realism, shrewdness and impracticality, plus abundant and wild sexuality. 
For Madame de Stael, who travelled to Russia in 1812, "in every way 
there is something gigantic about these people: ordinary dimensions have 
no application to them. . . . If they do not attain their goals it is because 
they exceed them." [8] George Brandes, a Danish literary critic, emerged 
with a different impression from his 1887 trip to Russia: "[I]ntellectually, 
the Russians impress the stranger by their realism, their practical, positive 
taste for real." [9] Yet the same author described Russians as "radicals in 
everything" and insisted that "when a Russian has got hold of a thought, a 
fundamental idea, a principle . . . he does not rest until he has followed it 
out to the last results." [10] So much for Russian realism and practicality. 
Another (stereo)typical statement comes from a group of Americans 
writing under the pseudonym E. B. Lanin, who noted in 1891 that 
Russians were "a good-natured, lying, thievish, shiftless, ignorant mass." 
[11] Such Western opinions about Russia and the Russians could be 
multiplied at will. 
This may or may not be a coincidence, but Western intellectuals 
promoting radical psychology spent a surprising amount of time pondering 
the Russian psyche, as it comes across in the novels of Dostoyevsky and 
the country's famous personages (Rasputin is still the most widely known 
Russian name in the West). In the process, they revealed much about 
their own psyche projected onto the Russians. Some of the most horrid 
actions in the novels written by Marquise de Sade (whose father was 
Ambassador to Russia ) were committed by Russians. L. Zacher-Masoch, 
of sado-masochism fame, was also a great admirer of Russian culture; his 
erotic novels were filled with Russian personages and loving descriptions 
of Russian sexual mores. Freud, who had many Russians in his Vienna 
circle, once noted that "even those Russians who are not neurotics are 
deeply ambivalent." [12] His favorite patient, known under the 
pseudonym "Wolfman," was a Russian man, who provided Freud with the 
model case of primary scene experience and neurotic hyper-sexuality. 
Apparently, the founder of psychoanalysis initially felt more comfortable 
assigning this psycho-sexual dynamics to exotic Russians rather than to 
more staid Austrians. 
Contrary to popular view, Russians themselves had mixed feelings about 
psychology. [13] "People call me 'psychologist,'" complained Dostoyevsky. 
"It's not true; I'm only a realist." [14] Tolstoy wrote pages exposing 
psychology as a false science. The Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin 
claimed that "every psychologist is a spy." In the early twentieth century, 
during the "Silver Age," a period of major cultural developments that 
culminated in the Russian revolution, many intellectuals expressed similar 
ambivalence about psychology. Vasily Rozanov, an influential literary 
figure of this era, thought that Russians did not need any science of 
psychology, because inherent in their nature was "psychological 
acuteness" -- a natural ability to empathize with others, which could only 
be smothered by rational psychology. After describing in his novel the 
onset of menses in a young girl, Boris Pasternak made a characteristic 
comment that she had no need for psychology, which could lure her away 
from the wondrous nature, perfectly capable of running its course without 
any aid from psychology. Vasily Ern, a neo-populist philosopher of the first 
decade of the century, made a similar point to disparage what he called 
"psychologism," which would only restrict the natural flow of subjectivity, 
arrest human will, and stop the miracle of immediate psychic action. [15] 
There was, of course, another intellectual strand among cultured 
Russians, the one that hailed psychology as an indispensable instrument 
for understanding the world and coping with social problems. This strand 
became more prominent in the 1910s, when chaos gradually enveloped 
the country, making more common economic and political explanations 
sound increasingly implausible. Zinaida Gippius, a Russian poet, made this 
diary entry about revolutionary Petersburg of 1918: "The reality is so 
bizarre that it is impossible to believe in facts as they are. Only 
psychology provides understanding." [16] More subtle -- psychological -- 
hypotheses were called upon to make sense of a society hurtling into a 
political abyss. This movement away from legal-rational schemes favored 
by modernity toward more irrational, post-modern explanations is 
indicative of the crisis of modernity in Russia and elsewhere in the world 
at the time. The depths of human psyche would be plundered in search of 
more radical explanations and cures for the ailings of the age. 
This turn toward psychology as a handy tool for reshaping human nature 
had its important precursors. One of them was Nikolai Fedorov, a Russian 
philosopher, who championed a utopian project of future society based on 
the principle called "psychocracy" and guided by a new science designed 
to make all people genderless and immortal. Odd as it may sound, 
Fedorov had many followers in Russia, including Dostoyevsky and Vladimir 
Soloviev. As late as the 1930s, Russian emigre political thinkers (P. P. 
Suvchinsky was the most prominent among them) swore allegiance to 
Fedorov and his philosophical social psychology. Fedorov's project had its 
historical counterpart in the psychological-religious program of "skoptsy" -
- a radical Russian religious sect whose members practiced voluntary 
castration of men and de-gendering of women (who had their breasts and 
clitoris amputated) as a path to sanctity. Ideas and rituals of this Russian 
religious sect curiously adumbrated some cherished bolshevik ideals like 
shared property, the end to competition, overcoming of gender 
differences, and blind loyalty to the leader. V. Bonch-Bruevich, a friend of 
Lenin and the Secretary of his Cabinet, took a life-long interest in Russian 
sectarians, apparently hoping to apply their experience to the 
monumental tasks facing socialist building. 
Psychological Science in Service of Communism 
It seems odd indeed that bolsheviks, the standard bearers of Marxism in 
Russia , would give credence not to economics and politics but to 
psychology as a main leverage for social reconstruction. But in retrospect, 
this does not seem to be that surprising. After bolsheviks seized banks, 
factories, communications and declared victory, they expected human 
behavior change accordingly. But they quickly discovered that political and 
economic power was not enough: to change old habits, one had to reach 
deeper into human psyche than politics or economics could. This is where 
"progressive psychology" came into full view as a queen science called 
upon to accomplish the task that the old culture reserved for tradition, 
religion, and common sense. Recognizing the failure of the objective 
economic and political conditions to effect desired behavioral changes, the 
party shifted its hope toward the psychology of hunger, pain, and death. 
This psychology was to help the party experts disabuse its subjects of 
obsolete beliefs, to reduce each individual to bare physiological reflexes, 
and to instil progressive forms of behavior. Bolsheviks insisted that 
everything should be planned and nothing remained unconscious. And 
they were convinced that the new science of human psyche was to do the 
trick. 
From before the revolution and throughout the Soviet era, Russian 
Marxists were sizing up the new discipline as a useful tool for future 
reforms. In their quest for a new psychology, Marxists tapped one unlikely 
source: Friedrich Nietzsche. Coming from an entirely different tradition, 
this German thinker complemented the native Russian strands with his 
thoughts about psychology as a science of the future capable of 
revolutionizing the entire society: "[P]sychology shall be recognized . . . 
as a queen of the sciences, for whose service and preparation the other 
sciences exist. For psychology is now again the path to the fundamental 
problems." [17] Bolshevik intellectuals, most notably Trotsky, Bogdanov, 
and Lunacharsky, accepted this Nietzschean precept and consciously 
sought to splice Marx's socioeconomic utopia with the Nietzschean 
psychobiological one. Unlike Nietzsche, they believed that the technical 
problems of implementing this idea could be solved within a few years 
with the help of psychological science. No, these people were not lunatics, 
though in retrospect, at least, they seem to be exceedingly naive in taking 
the Nietzschean program at face value. What other Europeans saw as 
metaphor and hyperbole, Bolsheviks took as a guide to action. 
While the ideological goals were perfectly clear to Russian Marxists, the 
practical means were still problematic. However, the optimistic leaders of 
the new order considered the task at hand to be a technical one. Neither 
Nietzsche nor Marx nor Freud confronted the problem head-on. 
Nietzsche's Superman was couched in mythological terms and its arrival 
was relegated to a somewhat indefinite future. Marx thought that human 
nature would change more or less automatically as soon as the new social 
and economic relations were formed. Freud seemed to have relevant 
methods, but they were not easy to apply. 
"The [new] man hasn't come yet, but he is not far away, and his 
silhouette is looming over the horizon," wrote in 1904 Marxist 
theoretician, psychiatrist by education, Alexander Bogdanov. [18] "To 
publish a new, improved edition of Man," intoned Trotsky, "this is the next 
task of communism." [19] The Soviet era's most brilliant psychologist, Lev 
Vygotsky, fully concurred: "In new society, our science will be in the 
center of life. . . . It will be the last science in the historical period of 
Mankind. . . . The new society will make a new human being. . . . This 
new science of new man will be nothing else but psychology." [20] An ex-
psychoanalyst, Aron Zalkind formulated in 1929 the main task of the new 
psychological discipline as the "mass construction of New Man." 
[21] Anton Makarenko, who succeeded Zalkind as a guru of Soviet 
psychology, explained the purpose of his "pedagogical science" this way: 
"We should take as our task the formation of that type of behavior, those 
characters and qualities of personality, which are necessary for the Soviet 
state." [22] The eugenics -- a biological science of breeding a better 
human specimen -- also drew a passing interests of Bolsheviks. In the 
mid-20s, Nikolai Koltsov, a brilliant researcher whose studies received full 
support from the authorities, sought to apply genetic methods for the 
artificial selection of future mankind. Ilya Ivanov, a biology professor, 
petitioned the Ministry of Education (Narcompros) with a more radical 
idea: the cross-breeding of African apes and Russian citizens. His proposal 
was approved and financed by the government, which gave Professor 
Ivanov hard currency and sent him to Africa . This was done at the time 
when Ivan Pavlov, a Noble prize winning physiologist, had no food to feed 
his experimental dogs. [23] The program of building the New Soviet Man 
would be continuously adjusted in its technical details, but its main thrust 
remained unchanged throughout the Soviet era. Years after Stalin's death, 
a prominent Soviet philosopher, Evald Ilenkov, restated the original 
program as follows: "Formation of the personality of the new, communist 
type man on a mass scale . . . now becomes a practical task and the 
immediate goal." [24] 
Implementing the ambitious program for educating a new man required 
extensive logistical arrangements. The Civil War was not yet over, but the 
spectacular institutional buildup in psychology had commenced. Six times 
more students registered as "pedagogic" majors in 1921 than in 1914. In 
1922, Moscow alone sported over twenty institutions devoted entirely to 
research and higher learning in psychology and pedagogy. [25] Four 
federal ministries -- of Education, Health, Railways, and Heavy Industry -- 
had their own pedological services. In 1923, the Russian Psychological 
Association, the Russian Psychoanalytical Association, and the Russian 
Association for Experimental Psychology opened up in Moscow . In 1927, 
the Moscow Testing Association was formed, along with the All-Russian 
Psychotechnical Association and the Soviet Pedological Association, which 
had their first Congresses the same year. This bloated establishment 
helped the Communist party select leaders, place people in appropriate 
positions, and improve their natural abilities. [26] 
Human Nature and Bolshevik Culture 
The term "human nature" generally connotes stable biological and 
psychological traits beyond social control. In this sense, "nature" is 
opposed to "culture." This usage, which goes back to Rousseau, is very 
common in liberal and skeptical discourse. Freud referred to human nature 
each time he wished to make a point how difficult it was to change man 
and society. Radical thinkers and totalitarian politicians valued psychology 
more than liberal ones. If you think that human nature is a constant and 
more or less perfect, you need no radical psychological intervention to 
make it better. Thus, F. A. Hayek rejected Freud, Skinner, and psychology 
in general as a tool for social reconstruction. [27] The more one despairs 
about human nature and wants to see it ameliorated, the more likely one 
is to invest in psychology. Radical psychology and radical politics went 
hand in hand throughout this century. For political extremists, human 
nature was not a nature anymore; rather, it was equated with culture and 
reduced to an underlying socio-historical context. What was made by 
history, the radicals surmised, could be remade in the new historical 
circumstances through conscious efforts. Understood in such a fashion, 
human nature presented itself as suitable object for political manipulation. 
More and more it would appear to Soviet theoreticians as just another 
word for human culture. This transformation of the familiar nature-culture 
construct [28] infinitely enlarged the scope for radical intervention in 
human affairs and offered endless creative possibilities for the early 
twentieth century Russian intellectuals. 
Since economic determinism proved rather helpless in affecting the 
human psyche, Bolsheviks turned to behavioral science for theoretical 
concepts and technical solutions that could complement Marxism. For all 
these thinkers, human nature appeared to be a culture in disguise, an 
infinitely malleable substance ready for social amelioration. Such was the 
broad ideological consensus that united otherwise different thinkers of this 
period. Said Vygotsky, "When we speak about the melting ( pereplavka) 
of man as a quality unquestionably required by the new mankind, about 
the artificial selection of the new biological species, we are dealing with a 
truly unique situation: man is the first and only biological species that 
makes itself." [29] "Psychotechnique" was among the most popular words 
of the epoch. Each major theorist construed it in a somewhat different 
way, but they all believed in the magic of "scientific" transformation to be 
accomplished with an aid of a well-tested psychological tool. For L. 
Vygotsky, it was "concept," for T. Lysenko -- "genes," for N. Marr -- 
"language," for A. Makarenko -- "groups." Responding to the official 
critique of his pedology, Zalkind sought to reassert his political 
credentials: "I always worked to prove an extraordinary sociogenic 
conditionality and plasticity of human behavior." [30] In 1931, Zalkind 
attempted to formulate the principles that would become the 
methodological canons for Soviet psychology, which included "activity," 
meaning that personality should be studied as an active and not a merely 
contemplative being, and "plasticity," implying that human nature was 
"not a warehouse" of ready-made traits but a store of dynamic 
potentialities. 
Trotsky's ideas were especially informative in this context. "Man is purging 
himself from top to bottom; he purged himself from God, State, and the 
Tsar, he freed economy from chaos and competition and is now purging 
his inner world from the unconsciousness and darkness." [31] Effortlessly, 
Trotsky crossed the line between the commonplace and utopia, economy 
and psychology, Marxism and Freudianism. Everything inherited from the 
past was to be "purged" from top to bottom. It was not long before 
Trotsky discovered that the metaphor of "purging" could be applied to him 
as well. While still in power, Trotsky sought a shortcut to the bolshevik 
scientific utopia via psychoanalysis. He became familiar with the field 
during his Viennese emigration in 1908. Adler and his wife were his 
personal friends; he attended psychoanalytical meetings and left 
remarkable memoirs on this subject. In 1931, Trotsky sent his own 
daughter to Berlin to undergo psychoanalytic treatment. His disciple, 
friend, and life-long collaborator, Adolph Ioffe, was a patient of Adler. In 
September 1923, Trotsky wrote a letter to Ivan Pavlov advising him to 
synthesize his physiology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Both Pavlov and 
Freud, Trotsky reasoned, looked in the same well of human spirit, 
although Freud did so from above and Pavlov from below. Trotsky's 
passion for psychoanalysis was infectious, as attested by the creation in 
1923 of the State Psychoanalytic Institute in Moscow. At the same time, 
the Russian Psychoanalytic Association had more top Bolsheviks as board 
members than professional psychoanalysts. Yet, this institution for 
psyching the New Soviet Man into existence did not survive Trotsky's 
political downfall. [32] We might add in passim that Trotsky's link to the 
psychoanalytic circles had an ironic and rather dark side. Naum Eitingon, 
head of Stalin's counterintelligence service who personally supervised 
Stalin's plot to assassinate Trotsky's, had an indirect link to the 
psychoanalytic establishment: his brother and business partner, Dr. Max 
Eitingon, was President of the International Psychoanalytic Association. 
Stalinist Psychology and the Psychodynamics of Soviet Power 
Like several other projects favored by Trotsky, this one was first rejected, 
then simplified, and finally put into action by Stalin. With the downfall of 
psychoanalysis and with encouragement from Stalin, "pedology" took its 
place as the chief psychological theory. Aron Zalkind became its official 
leader. An ex-psychoanalyst, he was the author of the unbelievably 
restrictive "New Sexual Commandment of Proletariat." Pedology, 
supported by Bukharin, Krupskaia, and Lunacharsky, had its boom around 
1930. Many psychoanalysts and psychologists, among them Sabina 
Spielrein in Rostov and Lev Vygotsky in Moscow, found refuge in its 
immense staff. In 1936, pedology was rejected by the Party and replaced 
with Makarenko's "pedagogic." Makarenko's normative vision for the New 
Soviet Man followed the familiar bolshevik blueprint. He was to love work 
for its own sake, be unswervingly devoted to the communist cause, and 
enthusiastic about any assignments that the party might give him. The 
transformation of an ordinary human into a model Soviet citizen must be 
radical and swift. The New Soviet Man's psyche would enable him to 
believe in the incredible, to endure the unbearable, to love things people 
normally hate. Sexual libido had to be reduced to a minimum along with 
other human needs, so as not to dissipate the individual's energy on trivial 
pursuits. Interpersonal feelings should give the way to "collectivist" 
identifications. Aggression and competitiveness would be neutralized in 
everyday life and reactivated when the country had to fight its foreign 
enemies. We can summarize the quasi-scientific concept of human nature 
and psychology espoused by Soviet theoreticians of this era as follows: 
(1) Human nature is far from perfect; its spontaneity is dangerous; like 
children, human beings should be kept under constant supervision; they 
require guidance and firm direction from knowledgeable adults. 
(2) Human nature is not fixed, but plastic and malleable; it can be 
changed in a methodical way; people, like children, are open to the 
molding influence of environment, culture, and society. 
(3) Transforming human nature is a complicated task; its ultimate aims 
and scientific procedures might not be fully understandable to the 
uninitiated; political education is the job for highly skilled and ideologically 
astute professionals. 
(4) Human beings owe their essence to society; the transforming power of 
society is vested in social groups or "collectives"; a suiting paradigm for a 
collective is an army unit or a labor team; family, peer groups, or other 
primary group formations do not qualify as collectives. 
(5) Concepts and words are primary psychological phenomena; personal 
experiences are verbally recoverable; the verbalization of personal 
attitudes is to be encouraged to facilitate official monitoring; nonverbal, 
unconscious, uncontrollable psychological processes are to be stamped out 
by the scientific manipulation of the human psyche. 
Not to be outdone by Trotsky, Stalin professed himself a proponent of 
"scientific psychology." [33] It was with his approval that psychology was 
added to the school curriculum as a mandatory discipline -- an 
unprecedented measure that remained in effect until Stalin's death. With 
Stalin solidifying his power over the Communist party and the country, the 
blueprint for raising a New Soviet Man changed somewhat. It was 
becoming even more rigidly ideological and, at the same time, more 
personalized. Elaborate networks of personal relations sprang up, without 
which nobody could successfully exercise power and climb up in the 
hierarchy. One is tempted to compare this tangle of political, economic, 
and personal relations to the operations of a mafia family. To be sure, the 
members of the latter do not seek to take over the entire society; they 
pray on society at large rather than try to transform it from scratch, as 
the bolsheviks set out to do. But there are some instructive similarities, 
nonetheless. They are apparent in the sustained efforts to impart the 
organization's ethos to its younger members, initiation rituals symbolizing 
the individual's dedication to the organization, emphasis on personal trust 
and undivided commitment to the leader, relentless power struggle and 
endless fights for a position closest to the chief de jour, readiness on a 
moment's notice to cut old ties and rededicate oneself to a new power 
configuration. Learning these rules by heart was as much a condition of 
success as a matter of survival for those caught in this deadly game. 
The mafia-like pattern of personal bonds was reproduced at all layers of 
power in Stalin's Russia . Each ministry, industry, army unit, work team, 
office, or scientific division identified with its chief -- a role model for his 
subordinates. A trusted comrade, such an exemplary individual would 
have the job done through the sheer strength of his character. A strong 
leader could accomplish the task even without technical expertise, as long 
as he possessed the right psychological stuff [34] . Strong will, 
intimidating demeanor, and heavy hand expected from a person aspiring 
for a leadership position in Soviet society. 
Not surprisingly, the parent-child relationship became the paradigm for all 
social ties under Stalin's rule. Stalin's image was drummed into the 
nation's psyche as a paradigmatic father figure, while Lenin was widely 
perceived as a grand-father of sort. Freud also noticed this pattern of 
leader-follower relationship, which he thought to be common to all 
politics. In the West, though, such psychological mechanisms were not 
altogether apparent; rather, they represented a fairly sophisticated 
analytical construct. In Stalin's Russia , on the other hand, people openly 
declared their love for the nation's padre familia. A Soviet professor could 
praise Stalin-the-father leading his grateful citizen-children to a bright 
future, and nobody in the audience would see anything wrong with this 
locution. 
"Some people say that thoughts appear in the human mind before they 
are uttered, outside of language, naked so to say," opined Stalin in a 
broadside against Freudian Marxists and all wayward psychologists, 
linguists, and philosophers interested in the notion of unconscious. "It is 
absolutely not true. Whatever thoughts man might have exist only on the 
language foundation, on the foundation of the language terms and 
phrases. There are no thoughts naked and free from the language 
material." [35] This strategic idea perfectly suited Stalin's totalitarian 
political aspirations. During his reign, anything that eluded ideological 
control and resisted correct political formulation was to be barred from 
existence, or at least from psychological textbooks. There is nothing in the 
human mind that is closed to the party's watchful eye, that could not be 
revealed and corrected. Society, or which is the same thing for Stalin, 
power, is in a position to program and reprogram human psyche. 
Whatever man conceals from himself, he conceals from the authorities. To 
postulate anything unreadable and unrecoverable in the human psyche 
was to doubt the party's omnipotence. This precept survived many 
transformations in Soviet psychology and remained central in the works of 
such diverse thinkers as Lev Vygotsky, Alexey Leontiev, and Evald 
Ilienkov. Thinking was nothing else but inner speech, and concepts were 
interiorized social hierarchies. 
Nature as Culture: Dimensions of a Metaphor 
Gender, aging, death -- all natural phenomena that could not be readily 
squeezed into an ideologically correct schema were suspect in Soviet 
psychological culture. The fact that the high ideological discourse 
systematically ignored the low bodily functions did not mean, of course, 
that the latter were wished away. Hidden in the interstices of an 
omnipotent culture were the incorrigible facts of human nature that kept 
intruding into life in spite of all the efforts the sanitize it, to purify it from 
natural imperfections. Thus, Soviets never managed to abolish death; 
when a person died, the rituals of grieving and burial were performed, just 
as they were centuries before the October Revolution. Despite repeated 
attempts, no cultural forms pertaining to birth, marriage, or burial rituals 
emerged in the Soviet Union that bore an unmistakable imprint of Soviet 
ideology. The latter failed to leave any noticeable traces because the 
human life cycle had no recognized place in Soviet ideology. Ideology had 
a lot to say on how humans should live, work, struggle, cherish 
motherland, but nothing at all on how they should go about giving birth 
and facing death. 
Compromises with nature were only temporary; ultimately, culture would 
overcome its inertia and make every bodily function follow a correct 
ideological blueprint. What follows is an attempt to codify some of the 
most salient characteristics that Soviet culture sought to impart to human 
nature, an ideal type of fully realized Soviet being toward which Soviet 
citizens were to move under the guidance of their spiritual leaders. 
Power as supreme value. Human needs and values are many, but so far 
as Soviet ideology was concerned, none came close in importance to 
acquiring power, wielding power, enjoying power. Power was more 
important than love, respect, and health. It was to give more pleasure 
than family, creativity, and sex. The reason for this imperative was 
simple: power guaranteed its owner access to all other values. Education, 
career, friendship, economic security, and sexual pleasures could be 
exchanged for power, measured through a proximity to the party and 
state leaders. Luxurious (by Soviet standards at any rate) life awaited 
high officials -- summer cottages, limousines, opera lodges, ostentatious 
food feasts, the company of artistic stars -- just about anything, except 
private property banned by Stalin. With the power base lost, the person 
would have to give up everything of personal value. The "cult of power" 
had a its psychological counterpart "the cult of personality," which Nikita 
Khrushchev denounced as the essence of the Stalinist political system. In 
the words of Bourdieu, [36] all forms of capital -- economic, cultural, 
psychological -- correlated with and derived from political capital in Soviet 
society. The case of Stalin's henchman, Lavrenty Beria, comes to mind, 
his fabled sexual exploits being greatly aided by his powerful position as 
head of the Soviet secret police. 
The Soviet authorities' uncompromising attitude towards private property 
and independent cultural pursuits makes perfect sense in this context, for 
these could not help but undermine the party faithful's monopoly on 
power and sever the link between the place a person occupies in the 
political hierarchy and the amount of pleasures meted out to this person. 
Of course, there are values that are difficult or impossible to redistribute, 
like health, youth, and physical beauty. The latter belong to nature, which 
place severe limits on what could be done through cultural manipulation to 
enhance them. Which is why the Communist party perceived such values 
as a threat to its total power. Unable to control these values, the regime 
methodically sought to devalue them in the public mind, deprive them of 
their traditional cultural meaning. Biological universalities and constants of 
human existence were given new cultural interpretations undercutting 
their natural significance. 
The subject as absence. Power was there to be wielded and enjoyed, but 
not conspicuously, for it did not belong to any particular individual. 
Contrary to the "cult of personality" thesis, Soviet power was not vested in 
a person; it came from the state and the party, whose comrades had to 
exude modesty and reticence and act as conduits for its collective wisdom. 
Trotsky showed too much personal ambition, which violated the 
Bolshevik's cherished beliefs. He acted like a master seducer conquering 
the feminine crowd, to use the image Freud employed in his essay on 
"Mass psychology." Trotsky's comrades never forgave him his charisma 
and mass appeal and ditched him at the first opportunity. By comparison, 
Stalin, was a paragon of modesty and collegiality. His demonstratively 
noncompetitive style in public suited well the spirit of the time. All top 
Soviet leaders had to suppress their ambitions and appear to the populace 
under the mask of humble servants of the state. Carefully planned and 
consciously constructed, Soviet power was modelled not so much on 
sexual conquest as on a long bureaucratic climb by leaders who proved 
themselves in the office, showed respect for their organization and its 
ethos, and were finally rewarded with the mantle of leadership. 
The subject, the flesh and blood human being was conspicuous for its 
absence in official Soviet life -- the fact reflected in the Soviet political 
speech. People were not supposed to say "I"-- only "We." The plural form 
"We" implied an infinite number of other comrades who would have said 
the same thing under similar circumstances. Passive voice and impersonal 
forms are ubiquitous in Soviet political jargon. "It is proposed that . . .," a 
typical sentence would commence, leaving the uninitiated wonder who is 
exactly proposing. English language does not quite capture such 
subjectless grammatical constructions so pervasive in Russian speech. 
Maybe some languages are better equipped for power play than other, 
though any language could be twisted to convey power symbolism. 
The Soviet leader was always a symbol, standing for something other than 
himself, embodying the idea of Soviet power, and subject to instant recall 
whenever he failed to communicate the proper message to his underlings. 
A replica of power rather than a self-motivated agent, the leader served 
not as a prototype but a monument to be worshiped in lieu of the original. 
It would be unseemly for a portrait, a replica, a copy to speak out on its 
own behalf. In fact, the original was power itself, and the Soviet state 
could be seen as a shrine in which citizens worshiped power. 
The psyche as discursiveness. The New Soviet Man had to be a supremely 
discursive creature, capable of verbalizing his innermost feelings and 
thoughts. No event of his psyche should have escaped notice -- his own 
and other responsible comrades. Psychological processes were to be 
recovered through speech. To control is to know, to know is to verbalize. 
Which is why confession qualified as the ultimate proof in Soviet legal 
practice. True, the confession might have been extracted by torture, but 
then pain and suffering, being nonverbal psychic events, were 
meaningless in themselves. 
The emphasis on discursiveness did not improve the quality of verbal 
production in the Soviet Union . The Soviet leaders's verbosity went hand 
in hand with their inarticulateness. To an extent, this was true of the 
Soviet people in general. [37] The content of speech meant little 
compared to the fact that someone was authorized to speak publicly, to 
voice an opinion. Public ceremonies -- from the Communist party 
congresses to meetings of local party cells -- were transformed into 
endless verbal exercises. Speeches were tedious, speakers repeated each 
other, there was little hard information presented to the audience, but 
that was beside the point. What really mattered was who got to the 
podium, in what order, for how long, etc. From all that an experienced 
observer could instantly infer the speaker's place in the pecking order, his 
closeness to the higher-ups, the amount of political capital at his disposal, 
and so forth. Generally, the more often a person spoke in public, the more 
importance people assigned to him. In his waning years, handicapped by 
numerous illnesses, Brezhnev felt obliged to give six-hour long speeches 
before the national audience, making the uneasy viewers wonder if he 
could survive the ordeal. 
Speaking took a precedence over writing in Soviet society. Those who 
wrote speeches were invariably lower in the social hierarchy than those 
who gave them. Published work also had a lower status than public 
speaking. Intellectuals engaged in writing and publishing wielded minimal 
political power. Their skills would bring them a decent living, but with very 
few exceptions (Maxim Gorky comes to mind here), Soviet writers did not 
ascent to the pinnacle of power and were never deified as Soviet political 
leaders given to public oratory. 
The right to voice an opinion in public was reserved for trusted comrades. 
Common folks had the right -- and duty -- to demonstrate their approval 
for the leaders and their public pronouncements. Characteristically, the 
very idea of democracy is linked in the Russian language with 
speech: golosovat -- to vote -- in Russian literally means "to practice 
voice." People deprived of the voting rights in the '30s due to their 
bourgeois origins or similar political indiscretions were referred to as 
"deprived of the right of voice." Gorbachev's campaign for openness --
 glasnost' -- was construed as regaining of voice and encouraging 
unauthorized speech. 
Body as pain. Soviet art often featured heroic deeds and titanic efforts in 
which individuals struggled, went through much suffering, and overcame 
pain to achieve worthy goals. It is much harder to find in it the 
representation of pleasure. Eating, dreaming, having sex -- any activity 
that did not pursue a public agenda and that could be enjoyed for its own 
sake was suspect. Soviet psychological culture was allergic to pleasure. 
The familiar Soviet formula: "With the feeling of deep satisfaction it is 
stated that. . ." hints at this ascetic sentiment, an aversion to pleasure. 
There is no grammatical subject in this verbal cliche. It is not the speaker 
who feels satisfaction; whatever positive emotions are registered here, 
they have nothing to do with the human body. Soviet citizens were 
expected to be motivated in their endeavors by a sheer enthusiasm for a 
collectively approved goal. Heroism Soviet style consisted in the 
overcoming human nature and acting as if body did not matter, as was 
the case with the famous war veteran pilot who took to the air to pursue 
enemy airplanes after loosing his legs in a battle. A common scene in 
Soviet war movies featured a proud soldier or resistance fighter refusing 
to give out state secrets while tortured by fascists. 
To be sure, the body stripped of its natural functions, immune to 
pleasures, and desensitized to pain, was only a cultural metaphor. People 
never stopped eating, imbibing, defecating, copulating, just as they 
continued to love and dream and think silly thoughts. It is amazing, 
Pasternak once said, that amidst all this madness, people still could have 
normal dreams. 
Death as silence. A voiceless individual was much less of a threat to the 
state than the one who did not surrender this party-given gift. A careless 
joke, a complaint about working conditions, an approving reference to 
genetics -- any statement that did not meet with official approval could 
cost an individual his voice. And when the party wanted to silence 
individuals permanently, it deprived them of their body, as well. A dead 
body is a silent body. In Soviet society, death commonly appeared as the 
ultimate form of censorship imposed on the discursively incorrect citizens. 
Any strong voice that stood out from the chorus and sang an unfamiliar 
tune was in danger. That is, unless this voice belonged to the beloved 
leader, like Lenin or Stalin, in which case death was but a temporary 
impairment to be rectified by the advancement of Soviet science. There 
are more than just ideological-propaganda reasons why the bodies of the 
deceased leaders in the Soviet Union were preserved in the best possible 
conditions. This practice goes back to the early Bolsheviks who, like the 
pre-revolutionary skoptsy and visionaries like Federov, entertained serious 
hopes that one day the mortal comrades could be brought back to life. 
The mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow where the bodies of Lenin 
and Stalin were placed after their death is a monument to this quest for 
immortality. 
As to the rank and file builders of communism, they had to face death on 
their own, unaided by official guidelines about its meaning or prospects of 
life after death. The nearly total absence of grieving rituals or even simple 
explanations pertaining to death in official Soviet culture is stunning. The 
political leaders did not fair much better in this department: they 
repeatedly revealed themselves unprepared for death, leaving the nation 
without a clue about its future and setting in motion protracted fights 
between potential successors for the leadership mantle. 
Age as power. Consider the ageless portraits of Soviet leaders. The 
authorities detested aging as a natural biological process immune to 
cultural manipulations. Determined efforts to overcome aging were 
mounted in the 20s, when a surgical procedure for rejuvenating testicles 
became popular among some bolsheviks, but the efforts apparently failed. 
Ever since, bolsheviks chose to ignore aging as a phenomenon worthy of 
serious attention. Childhood, youth, old age -- these natural stages in the 
human life cycle were virtually unknown to Soviet ideologists and, for a 
ling time, down-played by scientists. Nobody outlawed age differences, 
but the latter had not been given a positive account as distinct stages in 
personal growth. Childhood and youth had value as transitory periods 
allowing humans to practice their future roles as adult citizens. Age-
specific subcultures had been suppressed. Soviet youth had significantly 
less peer-group interactions than their counterparts in the West, and 
whatever experience they had was frowned upon by adults. For a long 
time, the country had no discernable youth fashion or holidays geared for 
children. Medical facilities for children were inadequate and counseling 
agencies nonexistent. By the same token, the authorities made no 
concerted efforts to build facilities for elderly people, to insure 
handicapped people's access to public areas, etc. Adulthood emerged here 
as a supreme value and a power base. Whatever the age of Soviet 
leaders, however infirm they might appear, they were hailed as productive 
adults. 
Gerontocracy is a pattern commonly found in non-democratic polities, but 
few modern societies pressed it as far as Soviet rulers. The latter 
continuously exhorted the younger generations to become more 
ideologically vigilant, economically efficient, and socially correct. In fact, 
most of the talk about the New Soviet Man was addressed by elderly 
leaders to the country's youth. Such officially approved organizations as 
the Oktobrists, the Young Pioneers, and the Young Communist League 
replicated the Communist party organization and adhered in their 
practices to adult values and tastes. Mandatory military service provided 
one official outlet where Soviet youth engaged in what seemed like age-
specific activities, but its heavy ideological indoctrination, sadistic initiation 
rituals, and brutal disciplinary practices turned it into a powerful 
mechanism for instilling rigid collectivist principles in Soviet youth. In fact, 
the armed forces duplicated the age bias found in Soviet society at large, 
as senior conscripts were allowed to brutalize at will their junior comrades. 
Gender as maleness. Officially, Soviet ideology tended to minimize gender 
differences. Men and women were expected to subscribe to the same 
values and beliefs, have the same psychological qualities, and engage with 
the same enthusiasm in building a future society. In practice, however, 
gender-based inequality pervaded Soviet society. People in power were 
predominantly males. The dominant culture in society was produced by 
males and for males. Women labored as hard as men did, but they had to 
carry a double burden -- at work and at home. In a way, women were 
allowed to stay closer to nature than men, as they continued to give birth, 
care for children, prepare meals, and do other things in the natural life 
cycle that could not be abolished by official decrees. Women worked in 
agriculture, education, or as general practitioners in medicine, leaving to 
men the areas of cultural creativity, industrial production, and military 
service. Males' alienation from nature was self-imposed; they were 
perfectly happy to let women take care of such natural functions, while 
they concentrated on cultural pursuits. As a result, the cultural violence 
unleashed by bolsheviks consumed more men than women. It is this 
closeness to nature that helped women survive the madness of Soviet 
civilization better than their male counterparts. 
The End of Stalinism and the Transformation of Soviet Psychology 
As an instrument of social change, violence was practiced since times 
immemorial by people subscribing to disparate ideological agendas. In 
recent times, the Nazis used it extensively to exterminate undesirable 
political (communist), racial (Jews and Gypsies), and sexual 
(homosexuals) groups. Those were narrowly targeted groups supposedly 
impeding the transition to a glorious state of the future. This very 
predictability of violence gave to the untargeted German citizens the 
sense of security. What made Stalin's terror different and profoundly 
affected the Soviet psyche was its randomness. Nobody was immune from 
purges; any person or group was a potential target and had to submit its 
share of sacrificial victims on the altar of power. 
There was no way to predict who the next victim would be. Sometimes 
verbal violence preceded physical violence, as was the case with the 
political trials unleashed during the campaign of mass terror in 1936. 
Other times, verbal attacks hinting at incarceration and death failed to 
inflict the expected damage. Thus, the vociferous campaign against 
pedology and its practitioners ordered by Stalin in 1936 stopped short of 
arrests and executions. In still other cases, deadly violence was applied 
without any verbal warning. The person and whole ethnic groups could 
vanish one day from their homes and sometimes from the face of the 
earth, as did Jewish writers in the late 40s and Crimean tartars during the 
World War II, to name just a couple examples. It was the sheer 
randomness of violence that infused Soviet people with unimaginable 
horror and left an indelible mark on their psyche. If fear is an expectation 
of punishment and guilt is the internalization of this expectation, then the 
Soviet psyche was permanently afflicted with both. Most people knew that 
they could be punished and felt guilty ways before they were actually 
accused of any wrongdoing. Soviet propaganda, in turn, worked over time 
to ensure that every person remained vigilant and ready to meet his fate 
if need be. Big terror without systematic deception would be a mass 
murder. Propaganda without terror would amount to a massive lie. But 
deception and violence working in tandem created a new psychological 
reality in their victims. The two reenforced each other and supported the 
system, which would have collapsed without these props. And when the 
Soviet regime gave up on random terror and concentrated mostly on 
deception as an instrument of social control, it doomed itself to an 
imminent demise. 
Changing adults' behavior is complicated business. Witness all the efforts 
to alter eating, drinking or sexual habits, which are met with only 
marginal success. The chief stumbling block here is that humans are 
expected to change their mind-sets and behavior while their environment 
remains basically the same. Moving an obese person into a famine area 
would surely produce dramatic results in reducing the person's weight. 
Moreover, attitude and behavior modification accomplished in such a 
dramatic manner often meets with less psychological resistance than the 
change that is supposed to be entirely voluntary. If people in Stalin's 
Russia adapted to the ideological demands without much resistance and 
even felt nostalgic about Stalinism, it is in large measure because the 
psychological changes sought by the regime were reinforced by drastic 
environmental changes, the total mobilization of resources, and the 
massive use of violence. 
Having renounced Stalinist methods, Soviet leaders had to place even 
greater emphasis on psychology, propaganda, and agitation. A slate of 
Stalin's successors, with the possible exception of Khrushchev, fancied 
themselves psychological vizards and touted their administrative and 
public relations skills as an asset in implementing the scaled down 
communist agenda. Brezhnev is reported to have bragged to his buddies 
that he might be weak in economics but that psychology and the art of 
governing were his strong suits. Chernenko, Brezhnev's successor, tried to 
reanimate the moribund Soviet society with yet another crack at 
"communist upbringing" and "instilling right values" in Soviet youth. 
Andropov, the ex-KGB chief, was a recognized master of deception. But 
the efforts to achieve change without violence, by relying chiefly on 
rhetoric and deception, proved to be a failure. When ideological vitriol and 
politically correct ranting are no longer followed by actions, punitive or 
otherwise, they lose their persuasive power and sooner or later start 
ringing hollow. 
This is what happened in the post-Stalinist era, when the level of verbal 
violence visibly escalated but the authorities' ability to move people 
around vastly diminished. Beginning the late 50s, the monolithic 
psychological culture began to give way to the one dominated by double-
think. In public, people still had to convey their enthusiasm for socialism, 
appear to be hard working, show moral fiber, exhibit genderless qualities, 
etc. But in private life, they could think and behave pretty much as they 
pleased, as long as they did not let their private actions spill over into the 
public arena. The opposition between nature and culture transformed itself 
into the opposition between the public and the private. Culture reigned 
over the public sphere, nature took over private life. In contrast to the 
public sphere where transactions grew excessively formal and ritualized, 
private life promoted unusually close emotional ties, which flourished 
undisturbed by envy and competition under the conditions of forced 
egalitarianism. Emotional bonding, personal commitment, aversion to cold 
calculations, the penchant for improvisation, and life-long friendships grew 
especially prominent among the intelligentsia. In private settings, Soviets 
often seemed to have preferred singing to speaking, perhaps because 
music entailed a strong nondiscursive element. These characteristics 
would be strikingly apparent to Western visitors, who learned to 
appreciate the company of intellectuals and emotional intimacy of the vast 
interpersonal networks that sprang to life in post-Stalinist Russia . 
But there was a price to be paid for these seemingly congenial and 
nonutilitarian personal bonds. The gap between word and deed, a deep 
contempt for the system and a forced public silence bred hypocrisy and 
encouraged self-hatred. When the gap would become intolerable and the 
person dared to voice his dissent in public, the authorities moved to 
silence the nonconformist. Even if the person did not resemble a new 
Soviet man in his private life, he still had to pretend to be one in his public 
appearances. The handful of dissidents who openly dared to challenge the 
Soviet system found this out the hard way. After denouncing Stalin's 
violence, Khrushchev and his successors did not shy away from the old 
punitive ways, even though they hesitated to practice violence on a mass 
scale and never dared to reintroduce random terror. From that point on, 
only public dissent would be a punishable offence. 
Psychology was fully institutionalized as an independent academic 
discipline in post-Stalin's Russia . The first psychology departments were 
established in the Moscow and Leningrad State Universities in 1964, a 
generation before the first sociology department was created in 1986. The 
discipline's premises remained more or less unchanged. "Our entire nature 
might be constructed," wrote Aleksey Leontiev, a leading psychologist of 
the this period, "and this is especially true about the psychological nature 
of man." [38] In his early research, Leontiev tried to show that humans 
can be taught to discriminate colors by touch. His findings were never 
confirmed, but Leontiev remained convinced throughout his life that 
human nature was an infinitely malleable social construct that could be 
made and remade at will. Another prominent Soviet thinker, Evald 
Ilienkov, expressed similar convictions that the human psyche could be 
shaped according to an ideological blueprint. He sought to prove his thesis 
through a study of congenitally blind-deaf-mute individuals, whose 
progress he guided and monitored for a number of years. The results 
seemed impressive: several of his subjects enrolled into the Moscow State 
University and successfully completed their undergraduate education. "In 
spite of the obstacles that seemed insurmountable -- the complete and 
innate absence of both vision and hearing -- it was shown possible to . . . 
shape a highly sophisticated human psyche." [39] His sensational theories 
fell apart, however, when his subjects confessed that their defects were 
not congenital but acquired between the ages of four and six. [40] 
A more sinister role in shoring up the official lies was accorded to Soviet 
psychiatry. Its chief exponent, Dr. Snezhnevsky, came up with an idea 
that political dissent in Soviet society was usually an indication of 
psychiatric abnormalities. He discerned the early signs of schizophrenia in 
the patients who "develop an odd . . . interest in abstract problems and 
harbor naive ideas about their resolution. In particular, [such patients] 
spend much time reading philosophical, psychological, sociological, and 
aesthetics treatises." [41] This doctrine rationalized the psychiatric abuses 
in the Soviet Union , the long-standing practice of institutionalizing 
political dissidents, labor organizers, religious activists, and simply 
independently minded people who refused to acknowledge the party line 
and dared to voice unauthorized views in public. Consciousness that failed 
to acknowledge Soviet reality in all its official glory was pronounced 
delusionary and subjected to medical treatment. The plight of dissidents 
committed to psychiatric facilities was in many ways worse than that of 
dissidents thrown to prisons, for as patients in psychiatric wards dissidents 
were isolated from normal human beings and had to endure the 
application of mind-altering drugs. They could also be kept in mental 
asylums indefinitely. There was a way for a patient to get out of the 
psychiatric prison: he had to renounce incorrect views and embrace the 
official line. Again, the healthy psyche was equated with discursiveness, 
the ability to spout right verbiage, the eagerness with which one was 
willing to present ideologically correct precepts as personal convictions. 
Wearing pious masks in public and cursing the regime in private would 
become a norm. Pervasive double-think could not help leaving its mark on 
the Soviet psyche. One of its insidious consequences was alcoholism that 
afflicted high-brow intellectuals and common folk alike. In the intoxicated 
state, Soviet citizens could transcend the fundamental duality of their 
being and achieve the unity of mind and action which the mendacious 
realities of everyday life denied them in their sober moments. This was 
also a way, however fleeting, to break through culture and reach out to 
nature inside and outside oneself. 
By the early 80s, the New Soviet Man's existence was as threadbare as 
that of the senile Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, whose barely 
functioning body was kept alive by valiant efforts of doctors and faith 
healers. A cultural construct that came to life in extreme historical 
conditions and required mass terror to prop it up, the New Soviet Man 
transpired as a pathetic monster whom nobody took seriously any longer, 
not even experts from the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, who 
kept themselves busy propagating the familiar nonsense but for all 
practical purposes ceased agitating the populace. Soviet citizens 
contemptuously referred to the New Soviet Man as "Sovok" -- a little 
shovel handy for collecting dust or absorbing ideological garbage. Such 
was the ignominious end of the communist superman -- Homo Sovieticus 
-- that Trotsky and his comrades dreamed about at the dawn of Soviet 
civilization. 
Conclusion: the Unbearable Lightness of Human Nature 
Among the causes contributing to the demise of the Soviet empire one 
has to count the psychological crisis that gripped Soviet society in the 
early 70s and wore it down through the 80s. Apathy, cynicism, and 
alcoholism had as much to do with the collapse of the Soviet regime as 
the falling prices on world oil markets and corruption among Soviet 
officials. Mikhail Gorbachev set out to lead the country out of its malaise 
and managed to breath some new life into old political forms. But in the 
end, perestroika failed to deliver on its promise, and not just because its 
architect was too slow to jettison obsolete ideological schemes, but also 
because he underestimated the depth of anger that enveloped Soviet 
society after its cherished myths were exposed. 
There were people who found postcommunist reality to their liking, but 
most cringed. The deadlocked political process, the wavering economic 
reforms, and the mounting chaos in daily life left many feeling nostalgic 
for the certainties of the bygone era. The break-up of the Soviet empire 
had a particularly strong effect on the Russian psyche. Even people 
detesting communism were troubled by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the nation's loss of its superpower status. From the psychological 
viewpoint, ex-Soviets found most upsetting the diminished sense of 
security and the sudden loss of personal identity. However arduous life 
was under the ancien regime, it accorded the individual a place in the 
social system, guaranteed employment, minimal standards of living, free 
health care, a chance to get ahead for those willing to play by the rules, 
and the sense that one belonged to a great nation. With wild capitalism 
replacing cradle-to-grave security, many people were frightened by the 
revolutionary forces they helped unleash. Blue and white color workers 
now faced unemployment; intellectuals found their spiritual bonds 
threatened by inequality; artists lamented the lost state subsidies for art; 
the once pampered military forces saw their prestige take a nose-dive; 
collective farmers felt reluctant to strike on their own as private 
producers; and nearly everybody felt the void inside. To fill this void, 
some turned to the discrete pleasures of private enterprise, others sought 
refuge in nationalism and religion, still others vowed to bring back the 
good old days of socialism and restore the Soviet empire to its glory days. 
Everyone has to master the difficult art of private living, with all its 
headaches, uncertainties, and opportunities. But identities, like new 
shoes, do not always fit. People are still groping for a self they could be 
proud of or at least comfortable with. Hopes are riding high for a 
miraculous cure that could deliver the country from its present morass 
and reinvest personal life with meaning. One indication that people are 
vying for a quick fix is the spreading hatred toward minorities who are 
blamed for current problems. Another -- the proliferation of psychics and 
future tellers in Russian society. Anatoly Kashpirovsky, an immensely 
popular faith healer who made his name during the late perestroika era, 
was invited by Vladimir Zhirinovsky to run as a representative of his so-
called "Liberal Democratic" party. Kashpirovsky agreed and was elected to 
the Russian Parliament. More sound liberals gathered around Yeltsin yearn 
for a miracle of their own -- the miracle of a free market. Yet the liberal 
idea that the free market would speedily transform the Soviet psyche into 
something more benign proved to be as misplaced as the radical claim 
that the socialist economy would deliver a new man. Which brings us back 
to the question of human nature in its relation to culture. 
In the previous sections, I examined the blueprints for the New Soviet 
Man, the techniques used to implement it, and the outcome of efforts to 
engineer a communist social species. The Soviet experiment was based on 
the assumption that human nature was flexible, malleable, passive -- that 
it was shaped anew in each historical era according to specific cultural 
blueprints. Indeed, human behavior could be influenced by social forces 
and changed on a mass scale, provided the efforts are reenforced by the 
total control over society and its members. But all such efforts are 
predicated on the willingness to use both violence and deception. As soon 
as the powers begin to let up on violence, humans recoil from extremes 
and revert to more common attitudes and actions. Even under extreme 
conditions, people are likely to change their habits rather than their 
motifs, their ideological verbiage rather than their bodily functions, their 
cultural forms rather than their natural desires. What Soviet experience 
appears to teach us is that revolutions against human nature are doomed. 
Culture might disguise nature but it could not abolish it altogether. This is 
not to gainsay that sex, gender, family, and work patterns bear a distinct 
historical and cultural mark, only that the variability in these patterns is 
limited by the universalities of human nature. For all the resources that 
the Soviet regime put into modifying human conduct, it had very little to 
show for its efforts. Soviet citizens emerged from the historical 
experiment that began in October of 1917 demoralized, but they have not 
lost their ability to love, to laugh, to kibitz, to hope. With time, they will 
form new habits to satisfy their basic needs. I do not know how the 
Russian psyche will evolve in the next few decades, but I am convinced 
that the Russian citizens will resist the temptation to succumb to yet 
another overarching ideological blueprint for a happy future. 
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